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tŚĂƚ ?ƐŝŶĂŶĂŵĞ ?Theorising the inter-relationships of gender and violence  
 
Abstract 
This paper explores the representational practices of feminist theorising around gender and 
ǀŝŽůĞŶĐĞ ?ĚĂƉƚŝŶŐ>ŝǌ<ĞůůǇ ?ƐŶŽƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞĐŽŶƚŝŶƵƵŵŽĨǁŽŵĞŶ ?ƐĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞƐŽĨƐĞǆƵĂů
ǀŝŽůĞŶĐĞ ?/ĂƌŐƵĞƚŚĂƚ ‘ĐŽŶƚŝŶƵƵŵƚŚŝŶŬŝŶŐ ?ĐĂŶŽĨĨĞƌŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚŝŶƚĞƌǀĞŶƚŝŽŶƐǁŚŝĐŚƵŶƐĞƚƚůĞ
ďŝŶĂƌŝĞƐ ?ƌĞĐŽŐŶŝƐĞŐƌĞǇĂƌĞĂƐŝŶǁŽŵĞŶ ?ƐĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞƐĂŶĚĂǀŽŝĚ ‘ŽƚŚĞƌŝŶŐ ?ƐƉĞĐŝĨŝĐ
communities. Continuum thinking allows us to understand connections whilst nevertheless 
maintaining distinctions that are important conceptually, politically, legally. However, this is 
dependent upon recognising the multiplicity of continuums in feminist theorising  W as well 
as in policy contexts  W and the different ways in which they operate. A discussion of 
contemporary theory and policy suggests that this multiplicity is not always recognised, 
resulting in a flattening of distinctions which can make it difficult to recognise the 
specifically gendered patterns of violence and experience. I conclude by considering how 
ĨŽĐƵƐŝŶŐŽŶŵĞŶ ?ƐďĞŚĂǀŝŽƵƌŵŝŐŚƚŽĨĨĞƌŽŶĞǁĂǇŽĨƵŶƐĞƚƚůŝŶŐƚŚĞĐŽŶƚĞŵƉŽƌĂƌǇŽƌƚŚŽĚŽǆǇ
which equates gender-based violence and violence against women. 
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violence, continuum thinking. 
 
Introduction 
 
This article arose from a mistake. My mistake.  
 
In April 2015, I was asked to speak about representations of sexual violence at London 
^ĐŚŽŽůŽĨĐŽŶŽŵŝĐƐ ?'ĞŶĚĞƌŽŵŵŝƐƐŝŽŶ ?When I had to provide a title for the paper, I did 
something not uncommon in academia: I hurriedly gave a title generic enough to enable me 
to work out specifics nearer the time. When that time arrived, I realised I had promised a 
paper on  ‘representing gender-based vŝŽůĞŶĐĞ ?.  Although I had intended to talk about 
ŵĞŶ ?ƐƐĞǆƵĂůǀŝŽůĞŶĐĞĂŐĂŝŶƐƚǁŽŵĞŶ, I had used a gender-neutral umbrella term. My paper 
became about this category error. 
 
This article continues that work. By beginning with my mistake I want to highlight that this is 
ŶŽƚĂŶŝŶǀĞƐƚŝŐĂƚŝŽŶŽĨ ‘ŽƚŚĞƌ ? representational practices, but rather of feminist theory itself, 
and its uneven absorption in policy and practice. After all, our linguistic choices are 
fundamentally conceptual (Cameron, 2014, 2016). Our words shape the ways in which it is 
(not) possible to understand the issues at stake, the ways they are legislated against, 
measured and resourced, and the responses which are deemed most urgent and 
appropriate. Yet, writing this article, I have realised how often category errors appear in my 
own work. Another example will illustrate this and introduce key themes to be explored in 
this article. 
 
Also in 2015, I co-wrote an application for a PhD studentship entitled  ‘Archiving and 
Historicising the Feminist Anti-Violence Movement ŝŶ^ĐŽƚůĂŶĚ ? ? The italicised words were, I 
thought, an elegant solution to the problem of naming the movement and a reaction 
against the more common  ‘ǀŝŽůĞŶĐĞĂŐĂŝŶƐƚǁŽŵĞŶ ? (or VAWi), a term which I think 
problematically implies ǁŽŵĞŶ ?ƐǀƵůŶĞƌĂďŝůŝƚǇƌĂƚŚĞƌƚŚĂŶŵĞŶ ?ƐƌĞƐƉŽŶƐŝďŝůŝƚǇ and omits a 
crucial detail: that this is a movement against violence against women. It implies that we 
accept that violence against women is an unchanging reality and our job is to support 
women in that context. TŚĂƚ ?ƐŶŽƚǁŚĂƚ/ƚŚŝŶŬĨĞŵŝŶŝƐƚŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĂƚŝŽŶƐdo, but our language 
makes it easy for others to infer this.  
 
 ‘DĞŶ ?ƐǀŝŽůĞŶĐĞĂŐĂŝŶƐƚǁŽŵĞŶ ? ĚŝĚŶ ?ƚǁŽƌŬĞŝƚŚĞƌ Psome of the organisations do not work 
exclusively on ŵĞŶ ?Ɛviolence but, for instance, also work against female genital mutilation 
which typically involves female perpetrators, even if acting in male interests. Indeed, it 
ǁĂƐŶ ?ƚĞǀĞŶĞǆĐůƵƐŝǀĞůǇǀŝŽůĞŶĐĞĂŐĂŝŶƐƚwomen: some key organisations also focused on 
ŵĞŶ ?Ɛ sexual abuse of children  W boys and girls. DŝŶĚĨƵůŽĨŵǇ>^ ‘ŵŝƐƚĂŬĞ ? ?/ĂůƐŽƌĞũĞĐƚĞĚ
the anachronistic, gender-neutral, buƌĞĂƵĐƌĂƚŝĐ ?ĂŵĞƌŽŶ ? ? ? ? ? ? ‘ŐĞŶĚĞƌ-ďĂƐĞĚǀŝŽůĞŶĐĞ ? ? 
 
And so we arrived at  ‘the feminist anti-ǀŝŽůĞŶĐĞŵŽǀĞŵĞŶƚ ?. Our project focuses specifically 
on feminist activism against inter-personal violence but - as Finn Mackay later pointed out  W 
the term we chosĞƐŚŽƵůĚĂůƐŽŝŶĐůƵĚĞǁŽŵĞŶ ?ƐƉĞĂĐĞĂĐƚŝǀŝƐŵ ?Our labelling had created 
unintended intersections, and new omissions. 
 
This example introduces some of the key tensions in the definition and use of umbrella 
terms in this field. Is our focus on commonalities among victims (violence against women), 
perpetrators (ŵĞŶ ?Ɛ violence), meaning (gendered or gender-based violence; sexual 
violence), or a theoretical and political approach (feminist)? This article focuses on varied 
conceptual intersections which feminists have sought to forge between different 
experiences and understandings of violence, and on the umbrella terms which have come to 
define the field. To discuss feminist approaches to connectivity, I introduce the term 
 ‘ĐŽŶƚŝŶƵƵŵƚŚŝŶŬŝŶŐ ?. This draws on Liz <ĞůůǇ ?Ɛ ? ? ? ? ? ?influential work ŽŶǁŽŵĞŶ ?Ɛ
experiences of sexual violence in which she ĂƌŐƵĞƐƚŚĂƚƚŚĞƉĞƌǀĂƐŝǀĞŶĂƚƵƌĞŽĨŵĞŶ ?ƐƐĞǆƵĂů
violence means that women make sense of individual actions in relation to a continuum of 
related experiences across a lifetime. For Kelly, the continuum can allow us to identify a 
 ‘ďĂƐŝĐĐŽŵŵŽŶĐŚĂƌĂĐƚĞƌƚŚĂƚƵŶĚĞƌůŝĞƐŵĂŶǇĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚĞǀĞŶƚƐ ?ĂŶĚ ?Žƌ ‘ĂĐŽŶƚŝŶƵŽƵƐƐĞƌŝĞƐ
of elements or events that pass into one another and cannot be readily ĚŝƐƚŝŶŐƵŝƐŚĞĚ ? 
(1988: 76). <ĞůůǇ ?Ɛwork has been adopted and adapted in a wide range of contexts to 
expose and explore connections between gender and violence. However, as contexts and 
connections vary, I argue here that it is necessary to think about continuums in the plural.  
 
In the next section, I ƵƐĞ ‘ĚŽŵĞƐƚŝĐĂďƵƐĞ ?to begin to explore the implications of different 
ǁĂǇƐŽĨƐŝƚƵĂƚŝŶŐƐƉĞĐŝĨŝĐĨŽƌŵƐŽĨŵĞŶ ?ƐǀŝŽlence against women. Naming practices make 
more or less visible who is doing what to whom, and foreground differing sets of 
connections. This leads into a discussion of continuum thinking ŝŶƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƚŽ ‘ŐĞŶĚĞƌ-based 
ǀŝŽůĞŶĐĞ ?, focusing on femicide to explore forms of connection this enables. This additionally 
opens up a consideration of some of the complexities of linking women ?Ɛ and children ?Ɛ
experiences. The discussion of feminist debates about pornography and/as gender-based 
violence against women which follows, unravels some of the benefits and limitations of 
expansive definitions of violence encompassing representation as well as action. Finally, I 
turn my attention to continuum thinking as a means of analysing ŵĞŶ ?ƐďĞŚĂǀŝŽƵƌƐ, 
suggesting that this challenges ƚŚĞĞƋƵĂƚŝŽŶŽĨ ‘ŐĞŶĚĞƌ-ďĂƐĞĚǀŝŽůĞŶĐĞ ?ǁŝƚŚ ‘ǀŝŽůĞŶĐĞ
against women ? ?Nevertheless, my aim is not to advocate for uniformity in language or 
claim that one tĞƌŵŝƐŶĞĐĞƐƐĂƌŝůǇ ‘ďĞƚƚĞƌ ? ?more feminist) than another. In fact, my 
argument is the opposite of this: namely, that the value of continuum thinking is to see 
connections not equivalences, and so to insist on the importance of distinctions. 
  
 
From naming the abuse to gender neutrality 
 
Debates about naming are essentially about context and connection: what else is this like? 
In tŽŵĞŶ ?Ɛ>ŝďĞƌĂƚŝŽŶDŽǀĞŵĞŶƚ activism, finĚŝŶŐĂůĂŶŐƵĂŐĞĨŽƌǁŽŵĞŶ ?Ɛ experiences of 
abuse  W previously normalised or rendered invisible - was crucial. Feminist consciousness-
raising allowed women to identify and understand the gendered, structural nature of their 
individual experiences of male violence. This allowed women to name certain forms of 
ŵĞŶ ?ƐǀŝŽůĞŶĐĞĂŶĚĂďƵƐĞĨŽƌƚŚĞĨŝƌƐƚƚŝŵĞ - wife-battering (Dobash and Dobash, 1979), 
incest (Armstrong, 1978), sexual harassment (MacKinnon, 1979). This process of uncovering 
ǁŽŵĞŶ ?ƐĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞƐĂŶĚŶĂŵŝŶŐĂďƵƐĞŚĂƐĐŽŶƚŝŶƵĞĚup to recent work on, for example, 
technology-facilitated sexual violence (Henry and Powell, 2015a, 2015b) or image-based 
abuse (McGlynn et al., 2017). But what is important about feminist naming practices is that 
they take place within an analysis of patriarchy in which an understanding of gender 
inequality is essential. Across different contexts (public/ private; offline/online), 
relationships (intimate/ familial/ collegial/ acquaintance/ stranger), temporalities (one-off/ 
repeated/ sustained) and cultures, feminists ask what these experiences have in common  W 
and how they differ?  
 
As knowledge and understanding of the issues has shifted, so too has our language. For 
example, ĞĂƌůǇǁŽƌŬŽŶŵĞŶ ?ƐĂďƵƐĞŽĨƚŚĞŝƌŝŶƚŝŵĂƚĞƉĂƌƚŶĞƌƐŽĨƚĞŶƵƐĞĚƚĞƌŵƐůŝŬĞ ‘ǁŝĨĞ 
ďĂƚƚĞƌŝŶŐ ?. As our understandings of intimate relationships and the spectrum of ŵĞŶ ?ƐĂďƵƐĞ
of women within those contexts developed, this language changed. The relationship of 
perpetrator to victim is still understood to define this kind of abuse (highlighted by terms 
such as domestic or intimate partner), but language which implies only physical assault 
(violence, battering) has been questioned. CĂŶ ‘ĂďƵƐĞ ?ďĞƚƚĞƌĞŶĐĂƉƐƵůĂƚĞ the range of 
physically, emotionally, financially and sexually controlling behaviours women experience? 
Or does this minimise the severity of specific violent incidents? Feminists have also been 
ĐƌŝƚŝĐĂůŽĨƚŚĞƵƐĞŽĨ ‘ĚŽŵĞƐƚŝĐ ?ĂŶĚ ‘ŝŶƚŝŵĂƚĞ ?ĂƐƋƵĂůŝĨŝĞƌƐ ?ĂƌŐƵŝŶŐƚŚĂƚƚŚĞǇŝŵƉůǇĂůĞƐƐ
severe form of violence, and the complicity of victims (Pain, 2014: 534). As these examples 
suggest, finding the right language remains a challenge, not least because of the need to 
allow women to name the everydayness of their experiences on the one hand, without 
minimising the severity (and, implicitly, criminality) of specific experiences on the other.  
 
DŽƌĞƌĞĐĞŶƚůǇ ? ‘ĐŽĞƌĐŝǀĞĐŽŶƚƌŽů ? (Stark, 2009) has entered the lexicon as a way of trying to 
address this problem, focusing on conceptualising domestic abuse as ongoing and 
cumulative. ^ƚĂƌŬ ?ƐǁŽƌŬŚŝŐŚůŝŐŚƚƐƚŚĞǁĂǇƐŝŶǁŚŝĐŚŵĞŶ ?ƐƉŚǇƐŝĐĂůĂďƵƐĞŽĨĨĞŵĂůĞ
partners is interwoven with intimidation, isolation and control such that the meaning of 
individual actions cannot be understood independent of the broader context in which they 
occur. An act which may seem innocuous in another context can be experienced very 
differently as part of a pattern of behaviour extending over ĚĞĐĂĚĞƐ PĞĐŚŽŝŶŐ<ĞůůǇ ?Ɛ
conceptualisation ŽĨƚŚĞĐŽŶƚŝŶƵƵŵŽĨǁŽŵĞŶ ?ƐĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞƐŽǀĞƌĂůŝĨĞƚŝŵĞ ? 
 
Although coercive control is becoming more widely understood in policy contexts, the 
gendered analysis of domestic abuse is inconsistently maintained. ^ƚĂƌŬ ?ƐǁŽƌŬŝƐ ?ŝŶƉĂƌƚ ?Ă
response to inter ?ŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůƐƵƌǀĞǇƐǁŚŝĐŚĨŝŶĚŵŽƌĞĞƋƵŝǀĂůĞŶĐĞŝŶŵĞŶ ?ƐĂŶĚǁŽŵĞŶ ?ƐƌĂƚĞƐ
of victimisation within intimate partnerships than might be expected (Walby et al., 2017). As 
Kelly and Westmarland (2014) argue, such suggestions of equivalence arise from attempts 
to define domestic abuse both through individual incidents (a punch, slap, etc.) and through 
controlling behaviours of long duration. A single push can be given the same statistical 
weight as repeated threats to kill. 
 
Indeed, it is now becoming increasingly common to see Ă ‘dual ĨŽĐƵƐ ? ?tĂůďǇĞƚĂů., 2017: 
24) on  ‘ǀŝŽůĞŶĐĞĂŐĂŝŶƐƚǁŽŵĞŶ and domestic violence ? (Council of Europe, 2011: 1) or 
 ‘ŐĞŶĚĞƌ-based ĂŶĚŝŶƚŝŵĂƚĞƉĂƌƚŶĞƌǀŝŽůĞŶĐĞ ? (EIGE, 2015: 20) in policy contexts. This seems 
intended to acknowledge the experiences of male victims as well as the abuse of both 
women and men in same-sex partnerships (on the basis of victimisation surveys referred to 
above). But conjoining these terms implies that domestic abuse is not violence against 
women, or gender-based violence. It means losing sight of the specific feminist analysis of 
ŵĞŶ ?Ɛ abuse of women in intimate relationships. This is not to deny the existence of 
ǁŽŵĞŶ ?ƐǀŝŽůĞŶĐĞĂŐĂŝŶƐƚŝŶƚŝŵĂƚĞƉĂƌƚŶĞƌs of any gender. More simply, it is to ask what we 
gain by making connections based on the status of the relationship rather than the broader 
socio-cultural context in which that relationship  W and the people in it  W exist.  
 
Notably  W unlike wife battering  W terms like domestic abuse, intimate partner violence and 
even coercive control are gender neutral. Indeed, Stark acknowledges the particular 
intersections coercive control brings to the fore: 
 
At the core of coercive control theory is the analogy to other capture crimes like 
hostage taking or kidnapping, a comparison that illustrates what Elizabeth Schneider 
ĐĂůůƐŝƚƐ ‘ŐĞŶĞƌĂůŝƚǇ ? ? ? ? ? dŚĞƐŝŶŐƵůĂƌĂĚǀĂŶƚĂŐĞŽĨƚŚĞĂŶĂůŽŐǇŝƐƚŚĂƚŝƚůŝŶŬƐǁŽŵĞŶ ?Ɛ
predicament in personal life to the larger discourse of rights and liberties we apply to 
citizen-victims, including the human rights discourse, implicitly undermining a major 
rationale that limits justice intervention in what are deemed just family matters. By 
using the gender-neutral language of power and control to frame abuse, the hostage 
analogy also supports an approach women have repeatedly used to gain legal rights 
men already possess, such as the right to vote or sit on juries.  
(Stark, 2009: 365) 
 
Stark is not alone in seeing ďĞŶĞĨŝƚƐŝŶůŝŶŬŝŶŐŵĞŶ ?ƐƌŽƵƚŝŶŝƐĞĚĂďƵƐĞŽĨǁŽŵĞŶŝŶŝŶƚimate 
partnerships with Ă ‘ůĂƌŐĞƌ ?, gender-neutral discourse. Catharine MacKinnon, for instance, 
has argued for conceptualising rape as torture (1993a) and Rachel Pain (2012, 2014) has 
made compelling connections between global terrorism and domestic abuse. However, 
situating rape and domestic abuse  W most commonly experienced by women in private - in 
relation to hostage-taking, torture and terrorism ƌƵŶƐƚŚĞƌŝƐŬƚŚĂƚǁŽŵĞŶ ?ƐĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞƐŽĨ
male violence can only be recognised analogously - when they can be related to experiences 
of violence in which victims are not, typically, targeted because of their gender. As Clare 
McGlynn (2008) notes in relation to DĂĐ<ŝŶŶŽŶ ?ƐƌĂƉĞ-as-torture argument, there is also a 
danger that using such extreme analogies disguises or minimises  W not least to women 
themselves (Gavey, 2005)  W experiences of male violence which do not cause explicit or 
long-term injury or fear. There is a curious paradox here: ŵĞŶ ?ƐǀŝŽůĞŶĐĞĂŐĂŝŶƐƚǁŽŵĞŶŝƐ
most visible when its gendered dimension ŝƐĚĞŶŝĞĚĂŶĚǁŚĞŶŝƚůŽŽŬƐŵŽƐƚůŝŬĞŵĞŶ ?ƐŽǁŶ
experiences of extreme violence (also Nayak and Suchland, 2006: 472).  
 
 
Continuities in meaning: gender-based violence 
 
Although I have focused so far on ŵĞŶ ?Ɛviolence against womeŶ ?ƚŚĞ ‘ďĂƐŝĐĐŽŵŵŽŶ
ĐŚĂƌĂĐƚĞƌ ?ƵŶĚĞƌůǇŝŶŐǁŽŵĞŶ ?ƐĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞƐŽĨĂďƵƐĞŝƐŶŽƚĂůǁĂǇƐĂŵĂůĞƉĞƌƉĞƚƌĂƚŽƌ ?ďƵƚ
rather the broader social meaning of the abuse: that women are targeted because they are 
women. This is now commonly taken as the basis of definitions of violence as gender based. 
Indeed, in international policy contexts violence against women is increasingly defined as 
violence which is gender based:  ‘Violence against women (VAW) is a form of gender-based 
violence that affects women excessively as it is directly connected with the unequal 
distribution of power between women and men, which perpetuates the devaluation and 
ƐƵďŽƌĚŝŶĂƚŝŽŶŽĨǁŽŵĞŶĂŶĚǀŝŽůĂƚĞƐǁŽŵĞŶ ?ƐĨƵŶĚĂŵĞŶƚĂůƌŝŐŚƚƐĂŶĚĨƌĞĞĚŽŵƐ ? ?(EIGE, 
2015: 3) 
 
In this widely-used definition, violence against women is a subset of gender-based violence. 
The terms are not strictly synonymous, although they are often treated as such (Nayak and 
Suchland, 2006: 468). What do we gain from thinking about violence against women (an 
umbrella concept which centres the experiences of women as victims/survivors of violence) 
as gender-based violence (an umbrella concept which focuses on the meaning of violence, 
rather than the identities of victims or perpetrators)?  
 
A useful example for considering this ƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶŝƐƚŚĞƚĞƌŵ ‘ĨĞŵŝĐŝĚĞ ? ?ZĂĚĨŽƌĚĂŶĚZƵƐƐĞůů ?
1992). The coining of this term is not (only) a question of semantics - highlighting the 
linguistic male assumption in homicide - but rather names a specific form of homicide: the 
murder of women because they are women. This is differentiated not only from male 
homicide but also from the murder of women in other contexts (e.g. indiscriminate spree 
shootings). Femicide tells us both who the victim is and why they have been targeted. 
 
Although femicide remains under-researched (Weil, 2016), one of the advantages of 
conceptualising the murder of women because they are women - as distinct from female 
homicide - is that it allows us to understand femicide on the continuum of (ŵĞŶ ?Ɛ) violence 
against women (Radford and Russell, 1992). As, globally, women are far more likely than 
men to be murdered by an intimate partner or family member (Walby et al., 2017: 2; 
Dobash and Dobash, 2015), this brings into view the inter-connections of femicide and 
ŵĞŶ ?ƐĂďƵƐĞŽĨǁŽŵĞŶŝŶŝŶƚŝŵĂƚĞƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉƐĂŶĚĂůůŽǁƐƵƐ ?ĨŽƌŝŶƐƚĂŶĐĞ ?ƚŽŵĂŬĞƐĞŶƐĞ
ŽĨǁŽŵĞŶ ?Ɛ(rational) fear of leaving abusive men (Stark, 2009; Dobash and Dobash, 2015: 
28).  
 
Yet, theorising femicide as the murder of women because they are women does not, 
necessarily, presuppose a male perpetrator. One area of femicide which sometimes involves 
female perpetrators is ůĞƚŚĂů ‘ŚŽŶŽƵƌ-ďĂƐĞĚ ?ǀŝŽůĞŶĐĞ ?ii Aisha Gill (2011) argues that placing 
 ‘ŚŽŶŽƵƌ-ďĂƐĞĚ ?ǀŝŽůĞŶĐĞŽŶƚŚĞ continuum of gender-based violence against women allows 
us to see continuities across cultures, challenging the notion that cultural values provide a 
unique justification for these crimes. This is particularly significant when the communities 
ƚŚĂƚƉĞƌƉĞƚƌĂƚĞ ‘ŚŽŶŽƵƌ-ďĂƐĞĚ ?ǀŝŽůĞŶĐĞĂƌĞ ?ĞƚŚŶŝĐ ?ŵŝŶŽƌŝƚŝĞƐǁŝƚŚŝŶĂĚŽŵŝŶĂŶƚĐƵůƚƵƌĂů
context (such as South Asian communities in the UK). Here the continuum becomes a 
ƉŽǁĞƌĨƵůƚŽŽůŝŶƌĞƐŝƐƚŝŶŐƚŚĞ ‘ŽƚŚĞƌŝŶŐ ?ŽĨƚŚĞƐĞĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚŝĞƐ ?ŝŶƐƚĞĂĚƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚing the 
connections between violence against women in the name of  ‘honour ? and forms of gender-
based violence against women in the dominant culture, such as domestic abuse (Gill, 2011: 
222). Expanding the continuum in this way means including acts which involve female 
perpetrators (albeit a minority). But asking who benefits helps to keep the role of patriarchal 
structures in view. This leads Nicole Westmarland (2015: xvi) to include honour-based 
violence, forced marriage and female genital mutilation as practices of ŵĞŶ ?Ɛviolences, 
noting that they are  ‘ĂĐƚƐďǇǁŽŵĞŶ ? ? ?ƵƐĞĚƚŽƵƉŚŽůĚŵĞŶ ?ƐƉƌŝǀŝůĞŐĞĂŶĚƐƵƉƉŽƌƚ
ǁŽŵĞŶ ?ƐŝŶĞƋƵĂůŝƚǇ ?.  
 
In her work on forced marriage, Gill  W along with Sundari Anitha  W also deploys a continuum 
ďĂƐĞĚŽŶǁŽŵĞŶ ?ƐĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞƐ ?ŶŝƚŚĂĂŶĚ'ŝůů ? ? ? ? ? P ? ? ? ?ŚĞƌĞƌĞĨĞƌƚŽĐŽŶƐĞŶƚĂŶĚ
ĐŽĞƌĐŝŽŶŝŶƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƚŽŵĂƌƌŝĂŐĞĂƐ ‘ƚǁŽĞŶĚƐŽĨĂĐŽŶƚŝŶƵƵŵ, between which lie degrees of 
socio-cultural expectation, control, persuasion, pressure, threat and force ?. As with the 
research which led Kelly to propose the continuum of sexual violence (1988), Anitha and Gill 
ĂƌĞĂďůĞƚŽŚŝŐŚůŝŐŚƚŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚĐŽŶŶĞĐƚŝŽŶƐďĞƚǁĞĞŶǁŽŵĞŶ ?ƐĞǀĞƌǇĚĂǇĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞƐ Wof 
constraints on marital consent  W and criminal, violent acts against them. Anitha and Gill are 
interested in two ways of conceptualising forced marriage, then: as part of Ă ‘continuum of 
ĐŚŽŝĐĞĂŶĚĐŽĞƌĐŝŽŶ ? ?2009: 165) linked to limitations imposed by  ‘ĐŽŵƉƵůƐŽƌǇ
ŚĞƚĞƌŽƐĞǆƵĂůŝƚǇ ? (Rich, 1980) and culturally-specific gender roles; and ĂƐ ‘ĂƐƉĞĐŝĨŝĐ
ŵĂŶŝĨĞƐƚĂƚŝŽŶŽĨĂǁŝĚĞƌƉƌŽďůĞŵŽĨǀŝŽůĞŶĐĞĂŐĂŝŶƐƚǁŽŵĞŶ ? ?Anitha and Gill, 2009: 166). 
They are concerned with dismantling binary ways of thinking which have disadvantaged 
ǁŽŵĞŶ ?ŶŽƚůĞĂƐƚŝŶƚŚĞůĞŐĂůƐǇƐƚĞŵ ?ǁŚĞŶƚŚĞŝƌĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞƐŚĂǀĞŽĐĐƵƉŝĞĚĂ ‘ŐƌĞǇĂƌĞĂ ?ŝŶ-
between coercion and consent, or violence and non-violence. Of course, these two 
conceptualisations are linked: compulsory heterosexuality is enforced by violence; violence 
is underpinned by constructions of heterosexually-appropriate gender roles (Gavey, 2005). 
But they are not the same: women can and do make positive choices about heterosexuality 
and marriage  W which is not to say all women can or do.  
 
In a 2012 article, Kelly notes (2012: xix) that the everyday, routine, intimate intrusions which 
ǁĞƌĞƐŽŬĞǇƚŽŚĞƌƌĞƐƉŽŶĚĞŶƚƐ ?ĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞƐŽĨƐĞǆƵĂůǀŝŽůĞŶĐĞŽǀĞƌƚŚĞĐŽƵƌƐĞŽĨĂůŝĨĞƚŝŵĞ
 W and thus foundational to the concept of the continuum  W dropped off many agendas in the 
intervening years because of the emphasis in much scholarship (and activism) on crime. 
Recent work like Anitha and Gilů ?Ɛ Was well as the Everyday Sexism Project (Bates, 2014), 
Hollaback movement (https://www.ihollaback.org), or Fiona Vera-Gray ?Ɛ (2016) work on 
street harassment, to give just a few examples W has done much to redress this. One of the 
implications of this approach is that, by focusing on ǁŽŵĞŶ ?ƐĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞƐĂĐƌŽƐƐŽƵƌůŝĨĞ
cycles, the continuum makes connections between our experiences as adults and girls. 
Whether these connections can then be extended to include the experiences of boy 
children is one of the questions I will now explore.  
 
 
Women, children and gender-based violence 
 
Linking the experiences of women and children has been conceptually important for 
feminist analysis. Firstly, ŝƚĂĐŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞƐƚŚĞƐŝŵƵůƚĂŶĞŝƚǇŽĨƐŽŵĞĨŽƌŵƐŽĨŵĞŶ ?ƐĂďƵƐĞŽĨ
women and children (of all genders). In particular, the co-existence of the (domestic) abuse 
of women and children within the same household points to the  ‘ŝŵƉŽƐƐŝďŝůŝƚǇŽĨĐƌĞĂƚŝŶŐ
ŵƵƚƵĂůůǇĞǆĐůƵƐŝǀĞĐĂƚĞŐŽƌŝĞƐ ? ?Kelly et al., 1996: 86). However, where the abuse of women 
and children overlap in this way, the abuse of children also needs to be understood as 
gender based: the children are targeted because of their significance within the household 
gender dynamics, including in cases of murder (Dobash and Dobash, 2015). However, not all 
abuse of children (in the home or outside) is gender based. TĞƌŵŝŶŽůŽŐǇƐƵĐŚĂƐ ‘ǀŝŽůĞŶĐĞ
ĂŐĂŝŶƐƚǁŽŵĞŶĂŶĚĐŚŝůĚƌĞŶ ? can suggest false equivalences between different groups of 
victims and water down a ŐĞŶĚĞƌĞĚĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐŽĨ ?ŵĞŶ ?Ɛ ?ǀŝŽůĞŶĐĞ ? 
 
This is apparent in a Scottish Government (2017) consultation on the draft Delivery Plan for 
Equally Safe, ^ĐŽƚůĂŶĚ ?ƐƐƚƌĂƚĞŐǇƚŽprevent and eradicate violence against women and girls. 
Despite the emphasis on women and girls in the original Strategy (Scottish Government, 
2014) ?ƚŚĞĚƌĂĨƚĞůŝǀĞƌǇWůĂŶ ‘ĞǆƉůŝĐŝƚůǇŝŶĐůƵĚĞƐchildren of all genders ?ĂŶĚĂŝŵƐƚŽ
 ‘ŝŵƉƌŽǀĞƚŚĞůŝǀĞƐĂŶĚĞxperiences of all children affected by violence ? ?Scottish 
Government, 2017: 3, emphasis mine). Here, the parallels between women and children 
appear to be drawn on the basis of an assumed shared vulnerability, rather than a gender-
based analysis of why and how women and children are targeted by men in domestic and 
other contexts. Of course, improving the lives and experiences of all children affected by 
ǀŝŽůĞŶĐĞŝƐĞƐƐĞŶƚŝĂů ?ƵƚĂĚĚŝŶŐ ‘ĐŚŝůĚƌĞŶ ?ŝŶƚŽĂƉůŶĨŽĐƵƐŝŶŐŽŶǀŝŽůĞŶĐĞĂŐĂŝŶƐƚǁŽŵĞŶ
and girls suggests a conceptual confusion which may have practical implications as very 
ĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚƐƚĂŬĞŚŽůĚĞƌƐ ?ǁŽŵĞŶ ?ƐŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĂƚŝŽŶƐ ?ĐŚŝůĚƌĞŶ ?ƐŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĂƚŝŽŶƐ ?ŵĂŬĞĐůĂŝŵƐŽŶĂ
specific, limited, pot of resources. It is important work. But why should it sit within this 
strategy? 
 
In contrast, thinking of ĐŽŶƚŝŶƵŝƚŝĞƐŝŶǁŽŵĞŶ ?ƐĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞƐacross time allows us to make 
conceptual linkages between child and woman abuse specific to girl children. This highlights 
ƚŚĞĞǀĞƌǇĚĂǇŶĞƐƐŽĨŵĞŶ ?ƐĂƚƚĞŵƉƚƐƚŽĐŽŶƚƌŽůǁŽŵĞŶĂŶĚŐŝƌůƐĂŶĚƚŚĞǁĂǇƐŝŶǁŚŝĐŚŽƵƌ
understandings of our gendered selves are shaped through these (inter)actions from 
childhood onwards. This is not to argue that women and girls are always and only victims 
but rather to consider the diverse ways in which we accommodate, collude, cope, resist and 
survive. It sees victimisation and survival as (moving) points on a continuum, rather than as 
binary and all-consuming identities (Kelly et al,, 1996).iii An indiǀŝĚƵĂů ?ƐŵŽǀĞŵĞŶƚĂĐƌŽƐƐ
this continuum is not uni-directional or strictly chronological (such that, for instance, child 
victim becomes adult survivor). This is ĂĚǇŶĂŵŝĐǁĂǇŽĨƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐŐŝƌůƐ ?ĂŶĚǁŽŵĞŶ ?Ɛ
multi-faceted experiences of victimisation and survival in relation to male violence.  
 
Nevertheless, establishing connections between children and women has opened feminists 
up to criticism that we infantilise women and downplay agency, whether in relation to 
sexual violence (see Kelly, Burton and Regan, 1996 for a discussion) or prostitution and 
pornography (Doezema, 2010). I will consider the challenges in conceptualising pornography 
ŽŶĂĐŽŶƚŝŶƵƵŵŽĨŵĞŶ ?ƐƐĞǆƵĂůǀŝŽůĞŶĐĞĂŐĂŝŶƐƚǁŽŵĞŶin the next section. Here I want to 
highlight that ƚŚĞĚŝƐƚŝŶĐƚŝŽŶďĞƚǁĞĞŶĐŚŝůĚƌĞŶ ?ƐĂŶĚǁŽŵĞŶ ?ƐĞǆƉĞƌŝ ŶĐĞƐŽĨƉƌŽƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶ
and pornography is typically configured in relation to sexual consent. Legally, children 
cannot consent to sex and so cannot consent to involvement in prostitution or pornography. 
ƐƚŚĞƚĞƌŵƐ ‘ƉƌŽƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶ ?ĂŶĚ ‘ƉŽƌŶŽŐƌĂƉŚǇ ?ĨŽƌĞŐƌŽƵŶĚƐĞǆ W and construct perpetrators 
as consumers  W ƚŽƉĂŝƌĞŝƚŚĞƌǁŝƚŚ ‘ĐŚŝůĚ ?ŝƐƚŽĨƵŶĚĂŵĞŶƚĂůůǇĚŝƐƚŽƌƚ ĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŽĨƉŽǁĞƌ ?
control and the impossibility oĨĐŽŶƐĞŶƚ ?ƐƐƵĐŚ ?ĨĞŵŝŶŝƐƚƐ ?ĂŶĚĐŚŝůĚƌĞŶ ?ƐŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĂƚŝŽŶƐ ?
insist on making ĂďƵƐĞǀŝƐŝďůĞǁŝƚŚƚĞƌŵƐƐƵĐŚĂƐ ‘ĐŚŝůĚĂďƵƐĞŝŵĂŐĞƐ ?ĂŶĚ ‘ƚŚĞĂďƵƐĞŽĨ
ĐŚŝůĚƌĞŶŝŶƉƌŽƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶ ?  ?tŽŵĞŶ ?ƐsŝĞǁƐŽŶEĞǁƐ ? ? ? ? ? ?. This is important, and brings 
power and the question of who benefits back into the equation.iv 
 
But the possibility ŽĨĂŶĂĚƵůƚǁŽŵĂŶ ?Ɛsexual consent does not magically remove coercion. 
What happens when children abused in pornography become adults and  ‘ĐŚŽŽƐĞ ?to 
perform in pornogƌĂƉŚǇŽƌ ‘ǁŽƌŬ ?ŝŶprostitution? Does the harm automatically cease? The 
scare quotes here highlight the extent to which choice is always contingent and the 
conceptualisation of prostitution as sex work is contentious within feminism. This is not to 
say that no woman freely chooses to work in pornography or prostitution  W nor is it to 
negate the importance of the possibility of choice, however constrained (Whisnant, 2004). 
However, aƐǁŝƚŚŶŝƚŚĂĂŶĚ'ŝůů ?ƐǁŽƌŬŽŶ ‘ŚŽŶŽƵƌ-ďĂƐĞĚ ?ǀŝŽůĞŶĐĞ ?using continuum 
thinking here opens up separate  W but interlocking  W ĐŽŶƚŝŶƵƵŵƐ P ‘ĂĐŽŶƚŝŶƵƵŵŽĨĐŚŽŝĐĞ
ĂŶĚĐŽĞƌĐŝŽŶ ?ǁŚŝĐŚĐĞŶƚƌĞƐǁŽŵĞŶ ?ƐĂŶĚĐŚŝůĚƌĞŶ ?Ɛexperiences (rather than legal 
definitions of consent); and a continuum of sexual violence (in which not all adult women 
would situate all of their experiences of prostitution and pornography). This unseats any 
binary distinction between child and adult woman without collapsing these experiences into 
one: the advantage of continuum thinking is to identify the ways in which they are related, 
without treating them as synonymous. Further, if we ask the who benefits question this 
allows for a rather different set of connections to be established, conceptualising ŵĞŶ ?Ɛ 
behaviour as buyers of women (and men, and children) in relation to broader ideas about 
ŵĞŶ ?ƐƐĞǆƵĂůŝƚǇ ?ƉŽǁĞƌĂŶĚƐĞǆƵĂůĞŶƚŝƚůĞŵĞŶƚ ? The importance of continuum thinking for 
understanding ŵĞŶ ?Ɛ behaviour is something I will return to, but first I want to consider 
another set of challenges pornography poses for continuum thinking. 
 
 
Representational continuums  
 
There is not space here to rehearse the arguments about pornography as/ and violence 
against women, which I have, in any case, summarised elsewhere (Boyle, 2014). Instead, I 
want to consider how continuum thinking helps conceptualise the dual realities of 
pornography as both material practice (real bodies, doing real things) and form of 
representation (staged, photographed, filmed, written, drawn).  
 
Recent strategies to make the abuses of pornography visible have included a challenge to 
the conceptual utility of the term itself. This has been most explicit in debates about so-
ĐĂůůĞĚ ‘ƌĞǀĞŶŐĞƉŽƌŶ ? ?a term which has become a media stand-in for the non-consensual 
ĐƌĞĂƚŝŽŶŽƌƐŚĂƌŝŶŐŽĨƐĞǆƵĂůŝŵĂŐĞƐ ?ƐǁŝƚŚĐƌŝƚŝƋƵĞƐŽĨ ‘ĐŚŝůĚƉŽƌŶŽŐƌĂƉŚǇ ? ?ĚĞĨŝŶŝŶŐƚŚĞƐĞ
practices as pornography can be argued to downplay their seriousness as acts of abuse 
committed by flesh-and-blood perpetrators with real-life consequences for victims 
(McGlynn et al., 2017). Instead, McGlynn, Rackley and Hougton (2017) propose the term 
 ‘ŝŵĂŐĞ-ďĂƐĞĚĂďƵƐĞ ?ŝŶĂŶĂƌƚŝĐůĞǁŚŝĐŚexplicitly uses <ĞůůǇ ?ƐŶŽƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞĐŽŶƚŝŶƵƵŵŝŶƚǁŽ
ways. Firstly, describing the continuum of image-based abuse allows them to expand the 
ĚŝƐĐŽƵƌƐĞďĞǇŽŶĚ ‘ƌĞǀĞŶŐĞƉŽƌŶ ? to establish similarities with other forms of image-based 
abuse, including so-ĐĂůůĞĚ ‘upskirting ?,v voyeurism offences, coercive spectatorship and 
sexualised photoshopping. By focusing on wŽŵĞŶ ?ƐĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞƐ ?ƚŚĞǇĂƌĞĂďůĞƚŽ
understand connections between practices which are otherwise very different: some 
ŝŶǀŽůǀŝŶŐ ‘ĨĂŬĞƌǇ ? ?ŽƚŚĞƌƐŶŽŶ-consensual production or distribution, but all causing material 
harms.  
 
It is striking that much of the behaviour McGlynn and colleagues describe has been 
facilitated by technological developments. Linking this to the burgeoning scholarship on 
ǁŽŵĞŶ ?ƐĚŝǀĞƌƐĞĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞƐŽĨƐĞǆƵĂůŝƐĞĚĂďƵƐĞŽŶůŝŶĞ ?ŶŽƚĂůůŽĨǁŚŝĐŚĂƌĞŝŵĂŐĞ-based), 
image-based abuse may therefore be conceptualised on a continuum of technology-
facilitated sexual violence (Henry and Powell, 2015a, 2015b) which impacts and constrains 
ǁŽŵĞŶ ?ƐĞŶŐĂŐĞŵĞŶƚǁŝƚŚƚŚĞĚŝŐŝƚĂůƉƵďůŝĐƐƉŚĞƌĞ(Tandon et al., 2015; Jane, 2017). More 
broadly than this, McGlynn et al. ?ƐƐĞĐŽŶĚƵƐĞŽĨƚŚĞĐŽŶƚŝŶƵƵŵŝƐƚŽ theorise image-based 
abuse as part of <ĞůůǇ ?Ɛ ? ? ? ? ? ?ůŽŶŐĞƌĐŽŶƚŝŶƵƵŵŽĨǁŽŵĞŶ ?ƐĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞƐŽĨŵĞŶ ?Ɛsexual 
violence. This is important in establishing the ways in which apparently new forms of sexual 
violence are conceptually and experientially similar to more well-documented patterns of 
abuse. As with Anitha aŶĚ'ŝůů ?ƐǁŽƌŬ, these conceptualisations thus allow us to see multiple 
connections in different contexts and support the broader argument I am developing here 
about ƚŚĞǀĂůƵĞŽĨ ?ƌĞ ?ĐŽŶĐĞƉƚƵĂůŝƐŝŶŐ<ĞůůǇ ?ƐĐŽŶƚŝŶƵƵŵŝŶƚŚĞƉůƵƌĂů. 
 
Conceptualising pornography per se as  ?ŵĞŶ ?Ɛ ?violence against women remains fraught in 
feminist theory and activism. One of the criticisms often levied at feminists who take this 
approach is that they conflate symbolic violence (patterns of representation) with material 
violence (actions). Although not focusing on pornography specifically, Walby et al. (2017: 
35) note that conflating gender inequality more broadly with violence against women 
specifically, runs the risk of stretching the definition of violence so far that nothing is not 
violence. As such, violence against women can become too amorphous to quantify - or 
resist.  
 
Similar arguments circulate in relation to whether harmful speech should be understood as 
literal violence. Whilst feminists have long highlighted the ways in which speech acts can 
engender harm and produce discrimination (MacKinnon, 1993b), placing threatening speech 
on a continuum of sexual violence should not mean, for instance, equating speech with 
rape. The expansion of the understanding of harmful speech in many contexts to include 
speech causing offence, and the equation of this with literal, physical violence, has, indeed, 
been used to silence feminist critique (Jones, 2015). In classroom settings, an unthinking use 
ŽĨƚŚĞ ‘ƚƌŝŐŐĞƌǁĂƌŶŝŶŐ ?ŚĂƐǁŽƌƌǇŝŶŐŝŵƉůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶƐŝŶƚĞƌŵƐŽĨĐůŽƐŝŶŐĚŽǁŶĚŝƐĐƵƐƐŝŽŶon, for 
example, sexual violence (Halberstam, 2016). Whilst there are important discussions to be 
had about trauma, triggers and pedagogy, Jack Halberstam (2016 ?ŚŝŐŚůŝŐŚƚƐĂ ‘ƉĂƚĞƌŶĂůŝƐƚŝĐ
ŶŽƌŵĂƚŝǀŝƚǇ ?ŝŶŵĂŶǇŽĨƚŚĞƐĞĞŶĐŽƵŶƚĞƌƐ ?ĂƐƐƵŵŝŶŐƚŚĂƚƐƵƌǀŝǀŽƌƐ ? experiences are uniform, 
that they are uniquely, extremely and permanently vulnerable, and that triggers are always 
literal. Here, it seems that continuum thinking has been abandoned in favour of analogous 
thinking (Cameron, 2014): claiming one thing  W speech -is the same as the other (violence), 
ƌĂƚŚĞƌƚŚĂŶďĞŝŶŐǁŝůůŝŶŐƚŽĞǆƉůŽƌĞƚŚĞ ‘ŐƌĞǇĂƌĞĂ ?ǁŚŝĐŚƚŚĞĐŽŶƚŝŶƵƵŵĂůůŽǁƐ ? 
 
I want to insist, then, on the importance of continuum thinking as a means of making 
connections, whilst noting the importance of clarity in relation to the nature of these 
connections and the necessity of distinction within this. This also means thinking about 
continuums in the plural. For instance, the abusive production practices of much audio-
visual pornography are appropriately positioned on a continuum of sexual violence that  W to 
take a mainstream example  W would not make sense for  ?> ?:ĂŵĞƐ ?ŶŽǀĞůFifty Shades of 
Grey (2012). On the other hand, the novel and hard core audio-visual pornography may 
exist on another continuum: a continuum of representations of sexual violence. To deploy 
another concept from Kelly, the representational continuum might provide a conducive 
context (Kelly, 2005, 2016) for additional, material acts of sexual violence: legitimating and 
supporting a culture of male sexual entitlement, dominance and coercive control (Boyle, 
2017). Fifty Shades represents male sexual violence against women, and could be conducive 
to real-world violence, but it is not  W in and of itself  W violence against women. This is as true 
of the Fifty Shades films as it is of the novels, as (unlike in hardcore) there is an assumption 
ƚŚĂƚƚŚĞƐĞǆ ?ĂŶĚƐĞǆƵĂůǀŝŽůĞŶĐĞ ?ŝƐ ‘ĨĂŬĞĚ ? W representation rather than real  W in 
mainstream contexts. 
  
So far, I have highlighted conceptual challenges  W as well as advantages  W arising from 
continuum thinking centring, to various extents, on ǁŽŵĞŶ ?ƐĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞƐ. In the final 
section, I want to consider some of the implications of a reorientation to more explicitly 
centre ŵĞŶ ?ƐďĞŚĂǀiours.  
 
dŚĞĐŽŶƚŝŶƵƵŵŽĨŵĞŶ ?ƐǀŝŽůĞŶĐĞƐ 
 
One of the key contributions of continuum thinking has been to establish the ways in which 
 ‘ƚǇƉŝĐĂů ?ĂŶĚ ‘ĂďĞƌƌĂŶƚ ?ŵĂůĞďĞŚĂǀŝŽƵƌƐŚĂĚĞƐŝŶƚŽŽŶĞĂŶŽƚŚĞƌ (Kelly, 1988: 75). This 
ĚĞŵĂŶĚƐƚŚĂƚǁĞƉĂǇĂƚƚĞŶƚŝŽŶŶŽƚŽŶůǇƚŽǁŽŵĞŶ ?ƐĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞƐŽĨŵĂůĞďĞŚĂǀŝŽƵƌ ?ďƵƚ
also to that behaviour itself and how it is rendered meaningful for men. Here, the concept 
ŽĨ ‘ŚĞŐĞŵŽŶŝĐŵĂƐĐƵůŝŶŝƚǇ ?ŝƐƵƐĞĨƵů ?ƉŽŝŶƚŝŶŐƚŽa pattern of practices  W not all of which are 
explicitly abusive, and which are enacted in culture and institutions as well as in gender 
performance and inter-personal relationships  W ǁŚŝĐŚĂůůŽǁŵĞŶ ?ƐĚŽŵŝŶĂŶĐĞŽǀĞƌǁŽŵĞŶ
to continue (Connell and Messerschmidt, 2005: 832). In this final section, I want to argue 
ƚŚĂƚŝƚĐĂŶďĞĞƋƵĂůůǇƵƐĞĨƵůƚŽĨĞŵŝŶŝƐƚĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐƚŽƚŚŝŶŬŽĨŵĞŶ ?ƐďĞŚĂǀŝŽƵƌƐ ?ƌĂƚŚĞƌƚŚĂŶ
ǁŽŵĞŶ ?ƐĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞƐ ?ŽŶĂĐŽŶƚŝŶƵƵŵ ? 
 
dŚĞĐŽŶƚŝŶƵƵŵŽĨŵĞŶ ?ƐǀŝŽůĞŶĐĞƐĂůůŽǁƐƵƐƚŽƚŚŝŶŬŽĨǀŝŽůĞŶĐĞĂƐďĞŝŶŐŐĞŶĚĞƌďĂƐĞĚŶŽƚ
because of who it targets but, rather, because of how that violence is understood in relation 
ƚŽƉĞƌƉĞƚƌĂƚŽƌƐ ?ŐĞŶĚĞƌƉĞƌĨŽƌŵĂŶĐĞƐ ?dŚŝƐĐĂŶĂůůŽǁƵƐƚŽŵĂŬĞŐĞŶĚĞƌĞĚƐĞŶƐĞŽĨ
ďĞŚĂǀŝŽƵƌƐǁŚŝĐŚĚŽŶ ?ƚƐĞĞŵƚŽĨŝƚĐŽŵĨŽƌƚĂďůǇŽŶƚŚĞĐŽŶƚŝŶƵƵŵƐǁĞŚĂǀĞexplored so far.  
 
For instance, in 2012, British entertainer Jimmy Savile was revealed to have been a serial 
sexual predator, his crimes spanning five decades. I have argued elsewhere (Boyle, 2017) for 
ƚŚĞŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶĐĞŽĨƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐ^ĂǀŝůĞ ?s crimes as gendered, but this might seem 
ĐŽƵŶƚĞƌŝŶƚƵŝƚŝǀĞ PĂůƚŚŽƵŐŚƚŚĞŵĂũŽƌŝƚǇŽĨ^ĂǀŝůĞ ?ƐǀŝĐƚ ŵƐǁĞƌĞŐŝƌůƐĂŶĚǇŽƵŶŐǁŽŵĞŶ ?ŚĞ
also abused boys and adult men. Yet, a large part of the reason he got away with it for so 
ůŽŶŐǁĂƐƚŚĂƚŚŝƐ ‘ĂďĞƌƌĂŶƚ ?ďĞŚĂǀŝŽƵƌǁĂƐƐŽĐůĞĂƌůǇ ĨŽƌĞƐŚĂĚŽǁĞĚŝŶ ‘ƚǇƉŝĐĂů ?ŵĂůĞ
behaviour which was highly visible and, indeed, celebrated. The way he sexualised his 
encounters with any and every woman and girl was a clear but, crucially,  ‘ŶŽƌŵĂů ? ?ĚŝƐƉůĂǇŽĨ
male sexual entitlement which both victims and bystanders often struggled to identify as 
abusive or problematic. A woman could not have behaved in the same way. There is no 
doubt that both his behaviour  W and institutional blindness to it  W was gendered. His sexual 
assaults on men and boys need to be understood in this context, as a further expression of 
his masculine dominance and power (Boyle, 2017).   
 
In the context of male violence against women specifically, Patrizia Romito powerfully 
argues:  
 
it is acceptable to talk about violence, but never about male violence. Here, too, we 
have adapted to this convention so far. Also, the documents of international 
ŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĂƚŝŽŶƐĂŶĚŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚƐ ? ? ? talk about violence towards women and children, 
but almost never of male violence, even if they describe husbands raping, maltreating 
and killing their wives. Rereading this text and international documents, in which the 
ĂĚũĞĐƚŝǀĞ ‘ŵĂůĞ ?ŝƐĂĚĚĞĚƚŽƚŚĞǁŽƌĚǀŝŽůĞŶĐĞ ?ŚĂƐƚŚĞĞĨĨĞĐƚŽĨĂƉƵŶĐŚŝŶƚŚĞ
stomach, because it confronts us with a brutal reality. It is this reality we are trying to 
escape from when we use euphemisms or generic and imprecise terms. 
(Romito, 2008: 5) 
 
tŚŝůƐƚ/ĂŐƌĞĞǁŝƚŚZŽŵŝƚŽ ?ƐĂƌŐƵŵĞŶƚ ?/ǁĂŶƚƚŽƚĂŬĞŝƚŝŶĂƐůŝŐŚƚůǇĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚĚŝƌĞĐƚŝŽŶƚŽ
argue that part of the feminist project in namiŶŐĂŶĚĚŽĐƵŵĞŶƚŝŶŐŵĞŶ ?s violence is making 
ƚŚĞĐŽŶƐƚƌƵĐƚĞĚŶĂƚƵƌĞŽĨŵĂƐĐƵůŝŶŝƚǇǀŝƐŝďůĞ ?ĂŶĚŚĞŶĐĞĐƌĞĂƚŝŶŐƐƉĂĐĞƐǁŚĞƌĞŵĞŶ ?Ɛ
rejection of violent norms is not only possible but desirable. For instance, when women kill 
this is seen as such an aberration that their gender is almost always remarked upon in 
media representations (Boyle, 2005). Yet when men kill, no qualifier is needed: it is assumed 
that a killer (batterer, torturer, terrorist) is male. By marking the term  W male killer, male 
terrorist  W we demand that rather than taking this conjunction for granted we think about it 
critically. This confronts us with a brutal reality, as Romito suggests, but it can also 
denaturalise male violence. 
 
Is there any advantage of using continuum thinking in relation to this far broader category 
of male violence? Can we, for instance, make connections between global terrorism and 
domestic abuse which are not analogous ďƵƚƌĞĨůĞĐƚ ‘ĂĐŽŶƚŝŶƵŽƵƐƐĞƌŝĞƐŽĨĞůĞŵĞŶƚƐŽƌ
events that pass into one another and cannot be reĂĚŝůǇĚŝƐƚŝŶŐƵŝƐŚĞĚ ? (Kelly, 1988: 76)?  
 
Some of the most high-profile acts of global terrorism and mass killings in recent years were 
committed by men with histories of attacks against known women. Writing in the Guardian, 
Hadley Freeman (201 ? ?ƐƵŐŐĞƐƚƐĂĐŽƌƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶďĞƚǁĞĞŶƚŚĞƐĞŵĞŶ ?ƐŐĞŶĚĞƌ-based violence 
ĂŐĂŝŶƐƚŬŶŽǁŶǁŽŵĞŶĂŶĚƚŚĞŝƌĞŵďƌĂĐĞŽĨĨƵŶĚĂŵĞŶƚĂůŝƐƚƉĂƚƌŝĂƌĐŚĂůďĞůŝĞĨƐǇƐƚĞŵƐ ? ‘ŽĨ
ƉƌĞƚƚǇŵƵĐŚĂŶǇŵĂũŽƌƌĞůŝŐŝŽŶ ? ?ǁŚŝĐŚĂĚǀŽĐĂƚĞǁŝůĚůǇƌĞƐƚƌŝĐƚŝǀĞĂƚƚŝƚƵĚĞƐƚŽǁĂƌĚƐŐĞŶĚĞƌ ?
Freeman points to the ways in which - ŝŶŵĞŶ ?ƐĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞƐ- different forms of violence can 
serve similar purposes as expressions of patriarchal belief systems. Thus, although  W for 
instance  W most of the attacks with multiple victims did not specifically target women, 
ƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐƚŚĞƐĞĂƚƚĂĐŬƐĂƐĐŽŶƚŝŶƵŽƵƐǁŝƚŚƚŚĞƉĞƌƉĞƚƌĂƚŽƌƐ ?ƉƌĞǀŝŽƵƐǀŝŽůĞŶĐĞƚŽǁĂƌĚƐ
ŬŶŽǁŶǁŽŵĞŶƌĞŶĚĞƌƐƚŚĞƐĞŵĞŶĚĞĐŝĚĞĚůǇ ‘ƚǇƉŝĐĂů ? ?This also provides a way of 
punctuating the self-aggrandising narratives of male exceptionalism which too often 
circulate around spectacularly abusive men such as terrorists or serial killers (Cameron and 
Frazer, 1987). It allows us to recognise these individuals  W and the stories that are told about 
their crimes - as generic, not exceptional (Boyle and Reburn, 2015). 
 
There is also an important point here to be made about the way in which the routine 
ŵŝŶŝŵŝƐĂƚŝŽŶŽĨŵĞŶ ?ƐǀŝŽůĞŶĐĞĂŐĂŝŶƐƚǁŽŵĞŶ ?ŝŶĞǀĞƌǇĚĂǇůŝĨĞĂƐǁĞůůĂƐŝŶƚŚĞĐŽƵƌƚƐ ?
facilitates these more publicly spectacular acts by providing a free pass to perpetrators. In 
:ĞĨĨ,ĞĂƌŶ ?s (1998) work with men who abused known women he found that minimisation 
was endemic in meŶ ?ƐĂĐĐŽƵŶƚƐŽĨƚŚĞŝƌďĞŚĂǀŝŽƵƌ. In their work with men who murder 
their intimate partners, Dobash and Dobash (2011, 2015) have similarly documented 
patterns of denial, minimisation, victim-blaming, and deflecting responsibility. These play 
out not only in the way the men talk about their murder convictions, but also more broadly 
in their accounts and expectations of gendered relationships. Whilst making crucial 
connections between lethal and non-lethal violence against women, Dobash and Dobash 
(2011: 114) tellingly ŶŽƚĞƚŚĂƚ ‘ ?Ğ ?ǀŝĚĞŶĐĞĂďŽƵƚƚŚĞĂĐƚŝŽŶƐĂŶĚŽƌŝĞŶƚĂƚŝŽŶƐŽĨǀŝŽůĞŶƚ
abusers and intimate partner murderers parallel reports of men who use violence in other 
contexts, especially violence against other men ? ? 
 
/ŶƚŚŝƐƌĞƐƉĞĐƚ ?ƚŚĞƌĞĂƌĞĂĚǀĂŶƚĂŐĞƐƚŽƚŚŝŶŬŝŶŐĂďŽƵƚŵĞŶ ?ƐǀŝŽůĞŶĐĞĂŐĂŝŶƐƚŽƚŚĞƌŵĞŶ W
at least in some circumstances  W as gender based. However, three important caveats here. 
Firstly, this is not a biological argument: in arguing that this is gender-based violence to the 
extent that it is perpetrated by men because they are men I am referring to the ways in 
which they relate to and embody particular  W often normative - constructions of gender 
roles. It is a constructionist, not an essentialist, argument. Secondly, I am arguing for the 
conceptual utility of this approach for understanding (and therefore working to eradicate) 
ŵĞŶ ?ƐǀŝŽůĞŶĐĞ ?/ĂŵŶŽƚƐƵŐŐĞƐƚŝŶŐƚŚĂƚƚŚŝƐŬŝŶĚŽĨƌĞĐŽŶĐĞƉƚƵĂůŝƐĂƚŝŽŶǁŽƵůĚǁŽƌŬůĞŐĂůůǇ ?
for instance. Finally, whilst this might provide a useful lens through which to consider 
abusive ŵĞŶ ?ƐďĞŚĂǀŝŽƵƌ ?ŝƚĚŽĞƐŶŽƚŶĞĐĞƐƐĂƌŝůǇŚĞůƉƵƐƚŽƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŵĞŶ ?ƐĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞƐ
of victimisation. Men are not necessarily targeted because they are men, nor is their 
experience of victimisation consistent with gender inequality (though it may be consistent 
with other vectors of oppression, such as race or class). There are exceptions of course: the 
explicit targeting of men who are (or seem to be) gay or trans, where they are attacked 
because of their perceived transgressions of dominant gender norms, for instance. But 
insisting that gender is not a synonym for women (and gender-based violence is not 
synonymous with violence against women) is not to argue that we simply add men to 
existing models  W ďƵŝůƚŽŶǁŽŵĞŶ ?ƐĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞƐŽĨǀŝĐƚŝŵŝƐĂƚŝŽŶĂŶĚƐƵƌǀŝǀĂů- and stir. 
Women and men are differently positioned in relation to gender-based violence. Placing 
men in gender-based violence, more often means making men visible as perpetrators.  
 
None of this is to deny that women can be perpetrators, or men victims. Rather, it is to 
highlight the conceptual limitations of the ways in which we currently frame gender-based 
violence, and argue that the inter-relationships between gender and violence are more 
multi-faceted than some models suggest. 
 
 
Conclusion: continuing continuum thinking 
 
Continuum thinking has been an essential element of feminist theories of gender violence 
for decades and has become mainstream to the extent that policy and practice is (in some 
contexts) less focused on isolated acts of violence and more sensitive to the  ‘ŐƌĞǇĂƌĞĂƐ ?ŽĨ
ǁŽŵĞŶ ?ƐĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞƐĂŶĚƚŚĞĐŽŶŶĞĐƚŝŽŶƐďĞƚǁĞĞŶƚŚĞŵ ?ŽŶƚŝŶƵƵŵƚŚŝŶŬŝŶŐŚĂƐĂůůŽǁĞĚ
us to make sense of experiences which had no name  W or no name which women recognised 
 W and to understand the ways in which gender violence is itself an expression of gender 
inequality. As I have outlined, continuum thinking has posed a series of challenges to 
established binaries such as violence/not violence, victim/survivor, real/virtual, child/adult, 
choice/constraint.  
 
However, the attempt to encapsulate and name the diverse experiences on the continuums 
which link gender and violence has been fraught with difficulty and has not necessarily 
supported feminist ends. In particular, the too-frequent conflation oĨ ‘ǀŝŽůĞŶĐĞĂŐĂŝŶƐƚ
ǁŽŵĞŶ ?ĂŶĚ ‘gender-based ǀŝŽůĞŶĐĞ ? performs a number of erasures which should be of 
concern to feminists.  Simply naming gender does not mean that our analysis is gendered  W 
indeed, gender-based violence can be a worryingly gender-neutral term which flattens 
important differences in terms of who is doing what to whom, in which contexts, to which 
effects, and to whose overall benefit. Ɛ^ĂƌĂŚDŽŽƌĞ ?Ɛ ? ? ? ? ? ?ǁŽƌŬŽŶ ‘ĚĂƚĞƌĂƉĞ ?ƌĞŵŝŶĚƐ
us, just because a term starts off doing feminist work does not mean that it continues to do 
so. Further research is certainly warranted into the contexts and conditions in which 
gender-based violence is used  W in policy, in practice, in theory, in the media  W but this 
article has indicated the extent to which it should be approached (and used) critically and 
with caution in the meantime. 
 
That said, the answer is not to abandon any of these terms or to claim one as inherently 
better (or worse) than the other, but to be alert and critical to the ways in which they are 
used and to think about the  W conceptual, political, practical  W work they enable us to do. 
We need to be conscious of the basis on which we seek to establish connections. Is our 
focus on commonalities among victims, perpetrators, meaning, kinds of behaviour, or a 
theoretical and political approach? Does our language accurately reflect this focus: do we 
ƚĂůŬĂďŽƵƚǀŝŽůĞŶĐĞĂŐĂŝŶƐƚǁŽŵĞŶ ?ŵĞŶ ?ƐǀŝŽůĞŶĐĞ ?ŐĞŶĚƌ-based violence, choice and 
ĐŽĞƌĐŝŽŶ ?ĨĞŵŝŶŝƐŵ ?KďǀŝŽƵƐůǇǁĞŶĞĞĚƚŽďĞƵŶĚĞƌƐƚŽŽĚĂŶĚ ?ĂƐ'ŝůů ?ƐǁŽƌŬŽŶ ‘ŚŽŶŽƵƌ-
ďĂƐĞĚ ?ǀŝŽůĞŶĐĞŽƌDĐ'ůǇŶŶ ?ƐŽŶ ‘ƌĞǀĞŶŐĞƉŽƌŶ ?demonstrates, this sometimes means using 
language we are critical of as a starting point. However, these authors work hard to keep 
the contingency and limitations of the language in view even when they reproduce it in the 
interests of clarity. Sometimes we need to speak in two voices. 
 
dŚŝƐƉůƵƌĂůŝƚǇĐĂŶĂůƐŽďĞƵƐĞĨƵůůǇƌĞĨůĞĐƚĞĚďǇŵŽǀŝŶŐĂǁĂǇĨƌŽŵĐŽŶĐĞƉƚƵĂůŝƐŝŶŐ ‘ƚŚĞ ?
continuum in the singular. What I have called continuum thinking is an important way of 
theorising the inter-relationships of gender and violence, but it also demonstrates that not 
everything is related in the same way and distinctions are important. We can and should be 
more explicit about the intersecting (but non-continuous) use of continuums to theorise 
differĞŶƚĂƐƉĞĐƚƐŽĨǁŽŵĞŶ ?Ɛ ?ĂŶĚĐŚŝůĚƌĞŶ ?Ɛ ?ĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞƐĂŶĚŵĞŶ ?ƐďĞŚĂǀŝŽƵƌƐ ?<ĞůůǇ ?Ɛ
ƌĞůĂƚĞĚĐŽŶĐĞƉƚŽĨƚŚĞ ‘ĐŽŶĚƵĐŝǀĞĐŽŶƚĞǆƚ ?(2005, 2016) offers another way of 
understanding the broader gendered social, political and cultural conditions which facilitate 
ŵĞŶ ?ƐǀŝŽůĞŶĐĞĂŐĂŝŶƐƚǁŽŵĞŶǁŝƚŚŽƵƚǁĂƚĞƌŝŶŐĚŽǁŶƚŚĞƚĞƌŵ ‘ǀŝŽůĞŶĐĞ ?ƐŽƚŚĂƚ W as 
Walby et al. (2017: 35) have cautioned  W it means everything and nothing.  
In conclusion, whilst insisting on the importance of establishing connections, I am 
nevertheless cautious of a depoliticised or uncritical use of continuum thinking. As the 
 ‘ŵŝƐƚĂŬĞ ?ĂƚƚŚĞďĞŐŝŶŶŝŶŐŽĨƚŚŝƐĂƌƚŝĐůĞĂƚƚĞƐƚƐ ?ƵŵďƌĞůůĂƚĞƌŵƐĐĂŶŽďƐĐƵƌĞŵŽƌĞƚŚĂŶ they 
reveal about the ways in which gender and violence are related. 
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i It would have been less cumbersome to have adopted abbreviations such as VAW (violence 
against women) and GBV (gender-based violence) in this article. However, such acronyms 
are arguably another means of obscuring the gendered specificity of violence and also point 
to an increasingly bureaucratic register (Cameron, 2016). As such, I have resisted the use of 
acronyms unless in direct quotation.  
ii ůƚŚŽƵŐŚĐŽŵŵŽŶůǇƵƐĞĚ ?ƚŚĞƚĞƌŵ ‘ŚŽŶŽƵƌ ?-based violence problematically centres male 
understandings of honour. For a discussion of the term, see Gill (2011). 
iii In her initial formulation of the continuum, Kelly (1988) was careful to note that the 
continuum was neither linear not hierarchical in terms of severity of violence, with the 
important exception of lethal violence. This exception is equally crucial to thinking of 
experiences of victimisation and survival as movable points on a continuum. 
iv Although there is not the space to explore this here, it is important to note that whilst 
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